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Instrument choice / the comparison of technology stan-
dards, performance standards, taxes and tradable per-
mits / has been a major topic in environmental law and
environmental economics. Most analyses assume that
emissions and health effects are positively and linearly
related. If they are not, this complicates the instrument
choice analysis. This article analyses the effects of a
nonlinear dose/response function on instrument choice.
In particular, it examines the effects of hormesis (high-
dose harm but low-dose benefit) on the choice between
fixed performance standards and tradable emissions
permits. First, the article distinguishes the effects of
hormesis from the effects of local emissions. Hormesis
is an attribute of the dose/response or exposure/re-
sponse relationship. Hotspots are an attribute of the
emissions/exposure relationship. Some pollutants may
be hormetic and cause local emissions/exposure effects;
others may be hormetic without causing local emissions/
exposure effects. It is only the local exposure effects of
emissions that pose a problem for emissions trading.
Secondly, the article shows that the conditions under
which emissions trading would perform less well or even
perversely under hormesis, depend on how stringent a
level of protection is set. Only when the regulatory
standard is set at the nadir of the hormetic curve would
emissions trading be seriously perverse (assuming other
restrictive conditions as well), and such a standard is
unlikely. Moreover, the benefits of the overall programme
may justify the risk of small perverse effects around this
nadir. Thirdly, the article argues that hotspots can be of
concern for two distinct reasons, harmfulness and fair-
ness. Lastly, the paper argues that the solution to these
problems may not be to abandon market-based incentive
instruments and their cost-effectiveness gains, but to
improve them further by moving from emissions trading
and emissions taxes to risk trading and risk taxes. In
short, the article argues that hormesis does not pose a
general obstacle to emissions trading or emissions taxes,
but that in those cases where hormesis does pose such a
problem, a shift toward risk trading or risk taxes would
be the superior route. Human & Experimental Toxicology
(2004) 23, 289/301
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Instrument choice has been a major topic of environ-
mental law and environmental economics. But to
date we have not addressed whether instrument
choice should be sensitive to the particular toxicol-
ogy of each pollution problem. How does the dose/
response relationship for a pollutant affect the
optimal choice of policy instrument to regulate
that pollutant? James Hammitt’s insightful article1,2
analyses many of the policy implications of a
hormetic or J-shaped dose/response function (in
which a substance is harmful at high doses but
beneficial at low doses).2,3 Examples of hormesis
may include vitamins, essential minerals, sunshine,
red wine, oxygen, salt and perhaps many other
substances, possibly even radiation and some pol-
lutants. Most of Hammitt’s article deals with the
implications of hormesis for standard setting: how
much protection against exposure the government
should require. In the last section of the article,
Hammitt briefly addresses the implications of horm-
esis for instrument choice. Given a standard to be
achieved, should the government use command-
and-control instruments such as technology man-
dates, or fixed limits on the quantity of emissions at
each source, or market-based incentive instruments
such as emissions taxes or tradable emissions
allowances? And, how is that choice affected by
the shape of the dose/response function?
Economic theory and experience show that if the
cost of emissions abatement varies across sources,
emissions taxes and tradable emissions allowances
will generally achieve a given standard at less cost (or
achieve greater protection at a given cost) than will
technology mandates or fixed emissions limits.4
Hammitt argues, however, that tradable emissions
allowances are likely to have less of an advantage
over alternative policy instruments if the dose/
response function is hormetic than if it is linear. He
says: ‘Under the hormetic model, a simple economic
incentive mechanism having a single tax or single
type of tradable permit would not be anticipated to
work as well as under the linear model’.1
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Policy instruments and dose/response
Market-based incentive instruments such as emis-
sions taxes and tradable emissions allowances re-
duce the cost of achieving a given level of protection
(or achieve greater protection at a given cost) by
allowing the degree of abatement to vary across
sources. This variation is often termed intersource
flexibility, ‘where flexibility’ or locational flexibility.
In contrast, fixed emissions limits allow each source
flexibility in its internal abatement or compliance
method (intrasource or ‘how’ flexibility) (as do
tradable emissions allowances), but no flexibility
to vary emissions across sources. (Fixed emissions
limits can allow ‘where’ flexibility within the
source; this is typically called a plantwide ‘bubble’
approach to aggregate emissions from the source.
Tradable emissions allowances expand the bubble to
encompass more than one plant or firm across a
region, thereby expanding the scope for intersource
‘where’ flexibility.) Technology mandates dictate
specific abatement methods at each source and
thus allow neither ‘where’ flexibility nor ‘how’
flexibility. If the cost of emissions abatement varies
across sources, then ‘where’ flexibility enables more
abatement to be undertaken at sources where it is
less costly, and less abatement to be undertaken at
sources where it is more costly. The result is the
same aggregate level of abatement, but at lower total
cost, and with some heterogeneity in the ultimate
level of emissions across sources.
Consider a hypothetical lake with the pollutant
smox emitted by four sources evenly spaced around
its shore: A, B, C and D. As shown in Table 1,
assume that without any required controls, each
source emits 20 units of smox, for a total of 80. Now
the government imposes limits to achieve a 50%
aggregate reduction to a new total of 40 units of
smox. The cost and location of this abatement
depends on the policy instrument the government
chooses. If the government imposes a technology
mandate (smox scrubbers) predicted to cut emis-
sions by 50% (to 10 units at each source for a new
total of 40), the cost per source will be $100, for a
total cost of $400. If, however, the government
imposes fixed emissions limits of 10 units per
source, each will again emit 10 for a total of 40;
source A will install the smox scrubber at a cost of
$100, but sources B and C will change their
materials inputs to reduce emissions at a cost of
$50 each, and source D will change its process
method to reduce emissions at a cost of only $20, so
the total cost will be $220. ‘How’ flexibility saves
$180. If, alternatively, the government imposes
tradable emissions allowances, issuing 10 allowan-
ces to each source, then again the total emitted will
be 40. But now the amount emitted at each source
may vary from 10. Source A will seek to avoid the
costly smox scrubber and instead purchase 10
allowances from the other sources at some cost
less than the scrubber’s $100. Source D will seek to
sell additional abatement at a price above its low
cost of abatement (say, $25 for the next 10 units). If A
buys 10 allowances from D, then A emits 20, D emits
zero, and B and C emit 10 each, for a total of 40. A
will pay somewhere between $26 and $99 to D to
purchase D’s 10 allowances; assume A pays $30 to
D, saving A $70 while earning D $5. B and C will
each spend $50 as before. The total abatement cost
will be $145 ($50 each at B and C, plus $20 at D for
the first 10 abated and $25 for the second 10 abated;
the extra $5 paid by A to D is a transfer). ‘Where’
flexibility saves $75 compared to fixed emission
limits and $255 compared to technology mandates.
A similar result would be obtained if the govern-
ment imposed an emissions tax; source A would pay
the tax while source D abates to avoid the tax and
sources B and C abate partially and pay partially.
The example above omits the administrative costs
of emissions monitoring and enforcement, which
would be necessary under all three policy instru-
ments. It also omits risk/risk tradeoffs with emis-
sions of other pollutants or into other media. It also
shows A purchasing allowances to return to 20 units
of emissions and not higher, on the intuition that if
A’s unregulated emissions were 20, A would not
now find it more profitable to emit more than 20 (at
the cost of additional allowances or tax payments);
Table 1 Illustrative emissions and costs under alternative policy instruments
Source No regulation Technology Fixed emissions Tradable emissions
Smox
emitted
Abatement
cost
Smox
emitted
Abatement
cost
Smox
emitted
Abatement
cost
Smox
emitted
Abatement
cost
A 20 0 10 100 10 100 20 0
B 20 0 10 100 10 50 10 50
C 20 0 10 100 10 50 10 50
D 20 0 10 100 10 20 0 45
Total 80 0 40 400 40 220 40 145
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otherwise A would have emitted more than 20 in the
unregulated case (for free). This observation sug-
gests an upper-bound to the bunching that may
occur under emissions trading: it is highly unlikely
that sources will purchase allowances to raise their
emissions above their unregulated levels. Given that
purchasing allowances (or paying the tax) is costly,
it seems almost inevitable that bunching cannot
exceed the unregulated (free) level of emissions, all
other factors held constant. Of course, a source’s
unregulated business-as-usual emissions might rise
over time as its product output grows, so a source
that initially emitted 20 might later want to emit 25
or more. Adopting a fixed emissions limit would
prevent that growth, but technology mandates could
permit such growth to occur at all sources, and
tradable allowances could permit such growth to
occur at some sources while reductions (to meet the
aggregate cap) occur at other sources. Also, if
emissions trading were introduced as a replacement
for previously imposed fixed emissions limits, then
emissions at source A might grow to exceed the
previous (regulated) level, but emissions at other
sources would have to fall more sharply as A
purchased allowances. Usually though, emissions
trading is adopted to meet a more stringent cap that
reduces aggregate emissions considerably below
previous requirements, so increases at any source
above the previous level are unlikely.
So far the analysis has ignored the dose/response
function; it has implicitly assumed that every unit of
exposure is equally harmful (constant marginal
harm from exposure), and that every unit of emis-
sions yields one unit of exposure (constant marginal
exposure from emissions). In that case, aggregate
harm depends only on aggregate emissions.
The claim is often made, however, that under the
locational flexibility allowed by emissions trading,
‘bunching’ of higher emissions in one or some
locations, like source A in the example above, could
create ‘hotspots’ (near source A) that increase total
harm (or decrease total harm less than intended). Of
course, as emissions allowances are bunched at A,
they must be ‘drained’ from other locations where
emissions are overcontrolled to sell allowances, like
source D in the example above, and perhaps the net
effect of draining and bunching is a wash. (The same
pattern of bunching and draining could occur under
emissions taxes.)
But the situation is more complex and depends on
the dose/response function illustrated in Figure 1.
Consider four possibilities.
(1) Under a linear dose/response function (each
unit of exposure causes one unit of harm), with
constant marginal harms of exposure, and constant
marginal exposure from emissions, bunching and
draining (heterogeneity in emissions) would not
increase total harm compared to a uniform distribu-
tion. They would offset each other. This is the
standard initial case analysed above.
(2) Under a supralinear dose/response function,
which is monotonically increasing (not hormetic)
but has increasing marginal harms (each added unit
of exposure causes more harm than the prior unit),
and with constant marginal exposure from emis-
sions, bunching would yield rising harms, but
draining would yield declining harms, compared
to a uniform distribution of emissions. Thus in the
example above, under emissions trading as com-
pared to the fixed emissions limits of 10 at each
source, the increase at source A from 10 to 20 would
raise harms more than if A and D each emitted 10;
but the decline at source D from 10 to zero would
also reduce harms more than if A and D each
emitted 10. The net effect is uncertain, and depends
on whether the buyers (bunching) and sellers
(draining) are above or below the average level of
emissions. (a) If buyers increase emissions above the
average and sellers reduce emissions below the
average, and the dose/response function has in-
creasing marginal harms, then the harms from
bunching above the average will likely exceed
(grow more steeply than) the benefits from draining
below the average. Divergence of buyers and sellers
away from the average of the supralinear dose/
response function will increase harms on net. (b) If
however buyers increase emissions from below the
average toward the average, and sellers reduce
emissions from above the average toward the aver-
age, then the result will be convergence toward the
average and the benefits of draining may exceed
(harms fall more steeply than) the harms from
bunching. Convergence of buyers and sellers toward
the average of the supralinear dose/response func-
tion will decrease harms on net. (In the smox
example above we began with uniform emissions
of 20 at each source, but in reality the buyers and
Figure 1 Dose/response curves
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sellers could start with different emissions, and then
either diverge or converge through emissions trading
depending on their costs of abatement.)
The supralinear dose/response case might de-
scribe the SO2 emissions trading system adopted in
1990 to reduce acid rain. Some sources of SO2 in the
midwest emit plumes that yield acid deposition in
relatively sensitive ecosystems such as the Adiron-
dack Mountains, while other sources in other parts
of the USA emit plumes that land in relatively
insensitive areas such as the Atlantic Ocean. If the
emissions trading programme had resulted in under-
control (bunching) by allowance buyers whose
emissions are deposited into the sensitive Adiron-
dacks (above average, steeper marginal harms), and
overcontrol (draining) by allowance sellers whose
emissions would thereby be removed from eventual
deposition into the insensitive Atlantic (below
average, flatter marginal harms), the net result could
have been an increase in harm compared to fixed
emissions limits. Congress was aware of this con-
cern but nonetheless adopted a national SO2 emis-
sions trading market for several reasons, including
the prediction that the pattern of actual control costs
at SO2 sources would yield the reverse: more
allowance selling (draining) at sources that deposit
into the Adirondacks and more allowance buying
(bunching) at sources that deposit into the Atlantic
or other places / a happy coincidence of control
costs and wind patterns yielding a net benefit from
emissions trading. That is, the SO2 market re-
sembled case 2(b) above, with draining occurring
on a steeper part of the dose/response function, and
bunching occurring on a flatter part of the dose/
response function, hence yielding net benefits de-
spite any bunching. Another consideration favour-
ing the adoption of the SO2 trading programme was
the prediction that the aggregate 50% reduction in
emissions from the 1987 level would help the
Adirondacks far more than any bunching might
detract from that benefit.
The supralinear dose/response case could also
describe an emissions trading programme in which
some emissions affect sensitive subpopulations who
are increasingly damaged by higher emissions.
Some have raised this point as an environmental
justice concern about sensitive subpopulations /
including low-income and minority populations /
who are residents located near sources of toxic
materials, such as emissions trading involving mer-
cury or industrial chemicals.5 The same two factors
that made trading a net benefit in the SO2 case could
also be applicable in the environmental justice
cases, but that is an empirical question, depending
on the pattern of control costs and thus of buying
(bunching) and selling (draining) and the corre-
sponding marginal harms.
The basic point here is that the concern about the
harmfulness of bunching and hotspots must arise, if
at all, from a supralinear dose/response function. If
the dose/response function is linear, as noted above
under (A), then bunching and draining due to
emissions trading would have no net effect on
harmfulness. (Fairness is another matter, to which
I return below.)
(3) If the dose/response function is sublinear, it
flattens out and has declining marginal harms with
increasing exposure. In this case bunching (from
buying allowances) and draining (from selling al-
lowances) would have the converse orientation to
the supralinear case. In the sublinear case, trading
would be beneficial on net if buying (bunching) and
selling (draining) diverge from the average, so that
bunching occurs where the dose/response curve is
rising but flattening out, and draining occurs where
the dose/response curve is falling more steeply. But
trading would be harmful on net if buyers and
sellers converge toward the average of the sublinear
dose/response curve, i.e., if bunching occurs where
the dose/response function is rising more steeply
and draining occurs where the dose/response curve
is falling slowly.
(4) Under a hormetic or J-shaped dose/response
function, harm increases with increasing exposure
above a certain positive exposure level (the nadir of
the function, labelled eM in Hammitt’s graphs for the
harm-minimizing exposure3), but harm also in-
creases with decreasing exposure below that point
(eM). If there are constant marginal exposures from
emissions, and if the regulatory standard (the
number of allowances) is set precisely at eM, and if
all sources begin at eM, then under hormesis,
bunching (undercontrol to emit above eM via buying
allowances) would yield increasing harms and
draining (overcontrol to emit below eM and selling
allowances), would also yield increasing harm
compared to fixed uniform emissions by all sources
at eM. Under these restrictive conditions, bunching
is harmful because it ascends the positively sloped
portion of the J-shaped curve to the right of eM; this
is the same problem as under a supralinear but
monotonically increasing dose/response function
(when bunching moves sources above the average,
as discussed above under case 2(a)). Under the
above restrictive conditions, the twist is that drain-
ing (overcontrol) is also harmful because it ascends
the negatively sloped portion of the J-shaped curve
to the left of eM.
If, however, emissions trading starts with some
sources emitting above eM and some emitting below
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eM, and if trading results in buyers bunching from
below eM upward toward eM, and sellers draining
from above eM downward toward eM (which de-
pends on their starting points and their costs of
abatement), then emissions trading would converge
to eM and to the level of harm under fixed emissions
limits set at eM.
In our smox example above, if the harm-minimiz-
ing level of exposure (eM) occurred with emissions
of 10 at each source (note that this assumes local
effects of emissions), then the unregulated emis-
sions of 20 at each source would be harmful, and the
move to fixed emissions limits of 10 at each source
would be optimal. Under emissions trading, the
increase at A from 10 to 20 would be harmful, and
the decline at D from 10 to zero would also be
harmful because under hormesis the harms also rise
as exposures fall below eM. If 10 is the optimal harm-
minimizing level of emissions (eM) (and emissions
translate directly into exposures), and if each devia-
tion of 10 emissions units in either direction
increases harm by, say, 10 units of harm (a V-shaped
hormetic curve which is linear at 458 angles on each
side of eM), then before regulation the aggregate
harm from emissions of 20 at each of four sources
was 4/10/40. With fixed emissions levels of 10 at
each source, the aggregate harm is zero. With
emissions trading as illustrated in the smox example
above, the harm is 10 from A emitting 20, zero from
each of B and C emitting 10, and 10 from D emitting
zero, for a total harm of 20. If the hormetic curve is
flatter than this (rises more slowly) on each side of
eM, the aggregate harm under emissions trading
would be smaller than 20.
Hormesis and the local effects of emissions are
distinct attributes
The first implication of this analysis is that the
effects of hormesis must be distinguished from the
local effects of emissions. Some pollutants may be
hormetic and have local emissions effects, while
others may be hormetic without their emissions
causing local effects. Hormesis is an attribute of
the dose/response or exposure/response relation-
ship. Hotspots are an attribute of the emissions/
exposure relationship. It is only the local impact of
emissions that poses a problem for emissions trad-
ing. In the example above under case (4), emissions
trading yielded increasing harms under hormesis at
both source A (increasing emissions) and source D
(decreasing emissions) only because we assumed
that the optimal emissions at each source (eM) were
10 and that deviations from that point would yield
harms. Some pollutants pose no such local effects
from their emissions. If smox affected the lake only
because of its aggregate concentration in the entire
lake and not its local concentration near each
source, then the reduction from 80 to 40 in the
lake would still be far above the eM of 10 and on the
positively sloped portion of the dose/response
curve, and the emissions trade between A and D
would not affect harms at all. Whether emissions
were at 20 or 10 or 0 at each source would not matter
to harms by itself; only the total smox in the lake
from all sources combined would matter.
Hammitt cites CFCs and CO2 as substances that
mix globally in the atmosphere and therefore the
emissions of which have no local effects: the harms
of these emissions are utterly independent of where
they are emitted and depend only on the total
quantity in the earth’s atmosphere.1 The ultimate
effects of ozone depletion and global warming
would be geographically uneven and would have
larger effects in some locales than others (e.g., the
ozone ‘hole’ over Antarctica, more skin cancer in
some populations than others, greater changes in
temperature and precipitation in some places, and
greater harms from sea level rise in some places), but
these impacts would arise from global processes
after the CFCs and CO2 are emitted and mixed into
the global atmosphere, and would not be affected by
the geographic pattern of the initial emissions. (A
caveat: extremely large local releases of CO2 could
have local effects, such as asphyxiation of ocean life
due to sudden sea floor outgassing, but such releases
are extremely rare and are not the kind associated
with fossil fuel combustion or emissions trading.)
Because their harms of emissions (and benefits of
abatement) are independent of the location of emis-
sions, both CFCs and CO2 are therefore excellent
candidates for emissions trading, including interna-
tional emissions trading. The USA used a tradable
allowance system to help phase out CFCs. The costs
of CO2 abatement vary considerably, so the cost
savings from emissions trading are quite large.6
But although CO2 emissions have no local effects
to speak of, CO2 does have a hormetic dose/
response function (that is, where response means
harm; CO2 seems to have a monotonically increasing
effect on temperature, but a hormetic effect on
human and ecological welfare). Whatever one thinks
of predictions that rising levels of CO2 in the
atmosphere may cause global warming, it is fairly
clear that declining levels of CO2 in the atmosphere
below some level would also be harmful. The
preindustrial level of CO2 in the atmosphere, circa
1800, was about 275 ppm; the current level in 2003
is about 375 ppm. Exposure rising above 400 ppm is
predicted to raise global average temperature. But
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exposure below, say, 250 or 200 or 150 ppm could
lower global average temperature dangerously and
also suppress plant photosynthesis. Just as the
historical record suggests that rising CO2 is asso-
ciated with warming, it also suggests that falling
CO2 is associated with cooling and ice ages. Cause
and effect are not fully established / perhaps
warming and cooling cause changes in CO2 concen-
trations rather than the other way around / but if
CO2 influences the climate, then it clearly exhibits
hormesis, and the optimal exposure (eM) is probably
somewhere around 250/350 or 450 ppm (although
this point is controversial and difficult to test), with
rising harms on either side.
Thus, hormesis alone does not pose any problems
for emissions trading. A necessary condition for
hormesis to detract from the success of emissions
trading is that emissions themselves have local
effects. The ‘where’ flexibility offered by emissions
trading is of concern only when the location
of emissions matters to harm. Not all cases of
hormesis are also cases of emissions-dependent
local effects.
Dependence on the level of protection
The above analysis shows how emissions trading
can under certain restrictive conditions perform less
well or even perversely if the standard is set at the
nadir of the hormetic curve (eM). In the example
above, case (4), emissions trading yielded increasing
harms (compared to fixed emissions limits at each
source) because the harms were dependent on local
emissions, and because both the buyer (A) and seller
(D) deviated from the optimal emissions point (eM)
at 10. Emissions-dependent local harm, however, is
only one of the necessary conditions for this
perverse result to be obtained. In addition, it is
also necessary that the standard has been set at or
near the harm-minimizing point (eM) on the hor-
metic curve.
If the standard had been set at a higher level than
eM, such as at the point Hammitt labels eL* or eH*
(the optimal points for the linear and hormetic
functions, respectively, when setting marginal ben-
efits equal to marginal costs of control), then modest
deviations from the standard by emissions allow-
ance buyers (bunching) and sellers (draining) would
still be on the positively sloped portion of the dose/
response curve, and the analysis would be similar to
that for the supralinear curve as described above in
case (2). Bunching would be harmful but draining
would be beneficial, and the net effect would
depend on where the bunching and draining occur
on the curve. If by contrast the standard was set
below eM (such as a very stringent level of control
for, say, red wine or vitamins, set below the optimal
level of that substance for long-term health), then
draining would be harmful but bunching would be
beneficial, up to eM.
Thus, in addition to depending on emissions
having local effects, the influence of emissions
trading on net benefits under hormesis depends
fundamentally on what level of protection is set and
how that level compares to the nadir of the curve
(eM). The perverse results are worst when the
standard is set precisely at eM, and the perversity
diminishes as the standard moves away from eM.
Yet it is unlikely that the standard would be set at
eM. As Hammitt shows, if there are positive marginal
costs of abatement, then under hormesis the optimal
level of control is still above (to the right of) eM, at a
point like eH*. On that analysis, the point eM would
only be the optimal point to set the standard if the
costs of abatement were zero, which seems implau-
sible. At eH*, the hormetic curve is supralinear, and
thus the impacts of draining are still beneficial (so
long as they do not go so far as to slip below eM). In
the example above, if eM were at 3 units of smox
emissions and the government set the standard at
eH*/10, and if A decided to buy only 6 units from
D rather than all 10, then the resulting emissions
would be A/16, B/10, C/10, D/4. A’s bunching
would increase harm above the alternative of fixed
emissions limits for each form at 10, but D’s draining
would reduce the harm compared to 10. Only if D
sells more than 7 would D slip below eM/3 and
incur the perverse harms of too few emissions. It
would be useful to review the emissions trading
programmes adopted to date, such as for leaded
gasoline, SO2 (acid rain), NOx , and now CO2, to see
if any of these programmes set the standard so low
near eM (and also had effects dependent on local
emissions) such that locational flexibility risked
perverse increases in harm from both bunching
and draining; and if the standards were set above
eM, then the effects of bunching and draining should
still be netted out along the linear or supralinear
dose/response function.
Some policies may of course set the level of
protection at or below eM, even if considering cost
would suggest a less stringent standard. If the
standard for a hormetic substance or agent is set
below eM, thereby depriving society of the health
benefits of increased exposure up to eM, it is
unlikely that emissions trading would be used to
implement the policy because the level would be so
close to zero that there would be little scope for
overcontrolling emissions and selling allowances.
Moreover, even if emissions trading were employed
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for a standard set at or below eM, it could turn out
that the sellers were the larger emitters (above eM),
and buyers were the lower emitters (below eM), so
that emissions trading yields convergence to the
optimal eM rather than divergent bunching and
draining away from eM.
Thus the only situation in which hormesis could
render emissions trading ineffective or perverse is
when emissions have local effects, when the stan-
dard is set at or near eM, when eM is sufficiently far
from zero to enable selling of allowances, and when
allowance sellers are emitting below eM and buyers
are emitting above eM.
Further, the relevant comparison is not just to the
alternative of fixed emissions limits at each firm, but
also to the level of unregulated emissions (eU). The
aggregate reduction in harm from unregulated eU to
the regulated level would often dominate any
increases in harm that might ensue from the hetero-
geneity in local emissions allowed by emissions
trading. That is, the difference between eU and the
standard set at eH* (or eL*) may be so great that any
bunching and draining around the standard would
be negligible in comparison. This was one of the
reasons for establishing a national SO2 trading
system in 1990, as noted above. If the benefits of
the aggregate reduction from eU to the standard are
large enough, they can outweigh any harms from
locational flexibility at every locale, thus yielding
net benefits at every locale. Of course, fixed emis-
sions limits could try to ensure greater net benefits
at the sensitive locales subject to bunching. But
fixed emissions limits would forego the benefits of
draining at other locations (unless the draining slips
below eM), and they would forego the cost savings
from emissions trading. Because the cost savings
from emissions trading may be the key to enabling
government to set more stringent standards than
under fixed emissions limits (as they arguably were
in the SO2 case), the increase in protection of
sensitive locations from employing fixed emissions
limits may be outweighed by the increase in aggre-
gate benefits to all locations (including the sensitive
locations) from employing emissions trading. To
illustrate using the SO2 case: if the cost savings
obtained by shifting from fixed emissions limits to
emissions trading enabled the programme to
achieve, say, a 10 million ton cut in national SO2
emissions rather than a 6 million ton cut in emis-
sions at the same or lower overall cost, but emis-
sions trading risked a 0.5 million ton increase due to
bunching at sources that would deposit in the
Adirondacks (although actually the pattern of abate-
ment costs suggested draining at such sources, as
noted above), then the extra 4 million tons of
aggregate emission reduction from emissions trading
as compared to fixed emissions limits could yield a
net benefit to the Adirondacks despite the bunching.
To illustrate using the smox example above: if the
cost savings from emissions trading ($75) were
partially or fully used to obtain more stringent
emissions reductions (i.e., by spending up to $220
under emissions trading to equal what would have
been spent under fixed emissions limits), thus
reducing aggregate emissions not just to 40 but,
say, to 24 (6 allowances allocated to each source
instead of 10), and if smox is not hormetic and its eM
is not low, then the extra harms to the area near
source A from any bunching due to A’s purchase
of, say, the 6 allowances from D could be out-
weighed by the benefits to all / and even to A
alone / from the extra aggregate reduction achieved
(16 units).
Fairness
Bunching and hotspots may be of concern for two
possible reasons, harmfulness and fairness. So far
we have addressed only harmfulness. Fairness con-
cerns may remain even if harmfulness is not
affected. In our initial smox example, fixed emis-
sions limits left each source with 10 units of
emissions, whereas emissions trading left A with
20, B and C with 10 each, and D with zero.
Assume that the dose/response function is linear
(with one unit of smox generating one unit of harm),
and that local emissions have local effects. Thus
under no regulation, the harms are 20 at each of the
four source locations and 80 in total. Under fixed
emissions limits, the harms are 10 at each and 40
total. Under emissions trading, the harms are 20 at
A, 10 each at B and C, and zero at D; the total harm
remains 40. This is case (1) analysed above in which
emissions trading makes no difference to aggregate
harm; the dose/response function is not supralinear
or sublinear or hormetic, so bunching and draining
have no disproportionate effect on harms. Harms are
40 under both policies, and no source has increased
its total emissions above the unregulated level of 20.
But now the local harms differ, and the community
near source A may complain of unfairness because it
suffers harms of 20 while the communities near B
and C suffer 10 each and the community near D
suffers zero. (The community could be the human
population or, say, the aquatic population of organ-
isms living in the lake near the source’s discharge
pipe. Whether a nonhuman ecosystem can raise
fairness concerns is another story; for now I assume
it can.)
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For example, perhaps smox causes impaired
childhood brain development (as does lead (Pb))
and attendant lost IQ, so that before all four com-
munities were equally (and seriously) impaired, but
now A’s children will gradually fall behind B, C and
D over time. The community at A might feel that this
is unfair even if A does not increase emissions above
its preregulation level of 20 (which as argued above
it would not), so that the community near A is at
least experiencing no greater emissions than it did
before the policy. Although the other communities
now experience lower emissions than they did
before the policy, they also incur the costs of
abatement. And the aggregate benefit is significant.
Still, equality of future opportunity (freedom from
unequal smox impairment) may be worth something
to each community, in addition to the aggregate
reduction in smox. If so, although the community
near A is not experiencing increased emissions, it is
harder to say that it is no worse off than before, given
that it has not enjoyed any reduction in emissions (it
is still at 20) and now it will lag behind the other
three communities in IQ over time (and its source is
paying to purchase some allowances / but that
might save jobs in A that are being cut in D). This
fairness concern might be restated as a claim that the
policy is not Pareto-improving for each community.
On the other hand, it is hard to argue that every
community should be exposed to equal risk. No-one
argues that police or fire protection should aim to
ensure equal mortality rates across all communities.
If the cost savings from emissions trading enabled a
tighter overall standard, then foregoing trading to
maintain uniform fixed emissions levels would be
less unfair to community A at the cost of greater
injury to all (more impairment of other children).
Perhaps community A could be compensated
through side payments or through the income tax
system. People near A could use the exit option to
move to B, C or D. Or community A could use its
voice to induce source A to reduce emissions
further, or the government to tighten the aggregate
level even further.
If the dose/response function is supralinear, such
as because of more sensitive subpopulations at some
locations, and if those subpopulations are subject to
higher emissions due to bunching, then those sub-
populations may raise a fairness concern that is
compounded by increasing harmfulness. This
would be the case if the community near A was
also sensitive to greater injury from smox than other
groups. This fairness concern is more compelling
than the fairness concern associated with linear
damages, because now the fairness concern is
combined with a greater vulnerability to harm.
This is the type of fairness concern often posed in
environmental justice cases, where a subpopulation
with lower incomes, perhaps lower nutrition and
education, and perhaps victims of historical discri-
mination on the basis of race or ethnicity, argues that
it would be subject to a higher exposure and that it is
more vulnerable to damages from each unit of
exposure. Of course, such concerns can be raised
wholly apart from emissions trading systems, such
as the siting of new industrial facilities.
On the other hand, if the sensitive subpopulation
is located where the source subject to emissions
trading is not bunching but draining, such as at
source D, then the combined fairness and harmful-
ness concern would be neutralized or reversed. This
was predicted to occur for the Adirondacks under
the acid rain trading programme, as lower-abate-
ment-cost SO2 sources in the midwest would over-
control (drain) and sell allowances to higher-
abatement-cost sources elsewhere which would
undercontrol (bunch) and emit into other less
sensitive deposition sites.
If the dose/response function is hormetic, and if
the standard is set at or near the harm-minimizing
level (eM), then the fairness concerns are compli-
cated by the possibility of harm from both higher
and lower exposures than eM under emissions
trading. As discussed above, however, it seems
unlikely that the standard would be set at eM.
Now assume that the harms depend only on the
aggregate level of smox in the lake, not on the local
emissions at each source. Then the community near
source A should have no fairness concern. A does
emit more than the others, but the local community
is not affected any more or less by these emissions
than everyone else. Indeed, the community near
A may be accused (rightly or not) of unfairness
by others around the lake who incur the harms of
the aggregate 40 and see A emitting fully half that.
(Of course A did so quite legally pursuant to
the government’s policy design, and the aggregate
reduction to 40 / which is all that matters in this
case / has been achieved at cost savings to A and
profits to D compared to fixed emissions limits.)
From emissions to risk
To the extent that hormesis poses a problem for
market-based incentives such as emissions trading
and emissions taxes, which as I have argued above is
limited, the solution to these problems may not be to
abandon market-based incentive instruments and
their cost-effectiveness gains, but to improve them
further by moving from emissions trading and
emission taxes to risk trading and risk taxes.
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One way to avoid the potentially perverse effects
of emissions trading or taxes under hormesis is to
forego emissions trading and taxes, and stick with
fixed emissions limits. As noted above, that choice
forfeits the cost savings and more stringent stan-
dards made possible by market-based incentives,
which may well be more important than the possible
perversities around the hormetic optimum. A sec-
ond option is to constrain the market by limiting
bunching (acquiring extra allowances) and draining
(selling allowances), such as by forbidding buyers to
buy more than a certain amount, or sellers to sell
more than a certain amount, or anyone to emit more
than some maximum and minimum. Those options
may be helpful but also inhibit the market and
curtail its cost savings. They are partial moves
toward fixed emissions limits. A third option is to
segment the market geographically so as to prevent
trades that cause bunching and draining in certain
places. For example, if the community near source A
is especially vulnerable, the policy could allow
emissions trading but prohibit sales to A. Or the
acid rain trading programme could restrict sales to
sources whose emissions would be deposited in the
sensitive Adirondacks (as New York State tried to
do, by forbidding LILCo from selling allowances to
upwind sources). These approaches also inhibit
transactions and forego cost savings. Thus in each
of these cases, the gains from avoiding hormetic
perversities must be weighed against the costs of
using the less cost-effective design.27
The fundamental reason that emissions trading
and taxes confront problems under hormesis is not,
however, a problem with trading or incentives. It is
the focus on emissions as the target of the policy.
Hormesis is vexing because it reveals that emissions
and exposure are not proportionate to risk. And as
Hammitt notes, even without hormesis, if emissions
are not always equally proportionate to exposure /
if emissions translate into different exposures at
different sources / then emissions trading and taxes
will not outperform command-and-control policies
as well as they do when emissions yield equal
exposures everywhere.
The lesson is that emissions are only an inter-
mediate stage in the production of risk. Policy can
operate at several different control points, including
the inputs to the firm (e.g., fuels and materials), the
firm’s internal processes and technologies (e.g.,
combustion methods, scrubbers), the firm’s outputs
such as emissions (e.g., emissions limits, allowances
or taxes), the ambient levels of the pollutant (e.g.,
workplace ambient standards or state-level NAAQS
or CO2 levels), exposure (e.g., worker protective
equipment) and ultimately risk (e.g., tort liability
or workers’ compensation). In practice we can see
examples of all of these approaches. Much air and
water pollution policy has focused on the firm’s
technology, emissions or ambient levels. And trad-
able allowance policies have often focused on
emissions (although the lead phasedown involved
tradable gasoline content credits applied upstream
to refiners / an arrangement that helped avoid any
local emissions effects).
But if emissions are not closely related to expo-
sure and in turn to risk, or are sometimes inversely
related to risk because of hormesis, then policy
should turn to controlling risk rather than emis-
sions. As Hammitt notes briefly, ‘A more compli-
cated system, in which the tax or quantity of permits
required per unit of exposure varies across subpo-
pulations in proportion to the marginal benefits of
reducing exposure could provide superior outcomes
but would be more complicated to develop.1
One approach would be a tax-subsidy regime
which taxes emissions (or exposure) above eM, and
subsidizes them below eM.
7 A second approach is to
trade risk allowances, not emissions allowances.8
‘Risk bubbles’ have been advocated within firms and
across site-specific projects. For example, Paul
Portney has suggested that ‘regulated entities, public
or private, should be allowed to relax pollution
controls at one point and install new protective
measures elsewhere, subject to a demonstration that
an overall improvement in health or environmental
quality will take place as a result of the change.’8 In
Richard Stewart’s formulation, ‘Under risk bubbles,
a facility operates under an aggregate, multi-media
‘umbrella’ of residuals limitations for the facility as
a whole. This ‘risk cap’ creates economic incentives
because higher levels of discharges by the facility of
a given residual in a given medium carry an
opportunity cost in the form of the resources that
must be devoted to reducing other residuals in order
to stay within the cap. In effect, the cap creates an
implicit internal residuals trading market.’9 Thus a
plant could relax air pollution controls at one place
in exchange for achieving an extra reduction in
water pollution emissions elsewhere in the plant or
at another plant in the area, subject to EPA approval
of the net reduction in risk. EPA and the plant
owners would negotiate the bubbling arrangement,10
and the plant owners would bear the burden of
proving that their water pollution reductions are at
least equal to the air pollution increase in terms of
environmental risk. EPA has begun to use risk
bubbles to allow net risk improvements at indivi-
dual firms through Project XL.9,11 Others have
advocated letting parties responsible for Superfund
cleanups negotiate agreements with host municipa-
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lities and states in which all would agree to spend
some of the funds on other measures that would
reduce risks even more, such as air pollution control
or city street lighting or vaccines for children.12
Frank Cross advocates setting an aggregate risk limit
(called a ‘risk cup’) and then requiring new sources
of additional risk to purchase offsetting reductions
in risk from existing sources of risk.13 The Clean Air
Act’s provisions for air toxics offsets (section 112(g))
and CFC substitutes (section 612) both authorize
interpollutant trading based on achieving reduc-
tions in overall risk.
The concept of risk bubbles, like emissions bub-
bles, represents an initial project-based version of
locational flexibility. And just as the experience with
emissions bubbles under EPA’s bubble, netting and
offsets policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s
became the basis for the more formal and more
successful emissions allowance trading policies for
lead, CFCs and SO2 in the 1980s and 1990s, so too can
risk bubbles build the groundwork for formal risk
allowance trading. Under formal risk allowance trad-
ing, each source would be allocated allowances to
cause a limited number of units of harm, significantly
reducing harm from the unregulated level. Then each
source, perhaps assisted by the government, would
calculate the effects of its activities on risk and apply
its allowances accordingly. Low-cost risk abaters
would reduce risks further and sell allowances;
high-cost risk abaters would buy allowances.
Risk bubbles and risk allowance trading would
overcome the problem of bunching, hotspots and
hormetic perversity / and perhaps even unfairness /
because they would measure results in risk rather
than in emissions. Thus if bunching emissions at
location A would increase risk, such as to a sensitive
subpopulation, that would require additional risk
allowances, and sources would have an incentive to
reduce those risks. If reducing emissions below the
hormetic nadir eM would increase risk, that would
require additional risk allowances (not fewer emis-
sions allowances). To be sure, a firm could purchase
additional risk allowances, increasing the risk it
poses. But as noted above, it is unlikely or incon-
ceivable that a firm would purchase costly allowan-
ces to emit or cause risk at levels higher than it would
have done before being regulated. Thus the creation of
a system of risk allowances, even if initially set at the
current level of risk in the aggregate (preventing
increases in risk), is unlikely to yield significant
increases at specific firms. And if the risk allowances
are issued at a lower level than is currently obtained,
net reductions could be anticipated in most places,
with buyers increasing above the standard but not
above the preregulation level.
In addition, risk bubbles and trading represent a
vehicle for integrated multimedia pollution con-
trol,14 overcoming the problems of cross-media
shifts of pollution and risk/risk tradeoffs across
substances, activities and fragmented narrow regu-
latory programmes that have plagued our risk
regulation regime.15 Provided all significant risks
created by the firm are counted, the risk bubble or
allowance system would remove any incentive to
shift away from one regulated activity or substance
or medium into another; the firm would be accoun-
table for every unit of risk it creates, and would have
incentives to reduce its overall risk in the most cost-
effective ways possible. ‘[T]he facility is forced to
internalize the environmental risks posed by its
operations and take them into account when evalu-
ating the regulatory feasibility and the economic
profitability of changes in technologies and produc-
tion. Any increase in one residual must be paid for
with reductions of others.’9 It would also stimulate a
wave of new innovation in risk-reduction opportu-
nities previously ignored under the current frag-
mented regulatory system.
Risk allowance trading is easy to parody and pillory
as selling the right to murder. But this epithet is
misplaced. First, risk allowance trading would not
authorize intentional assaults or any other forms of
risk creation that are already illegal. Criminal law
prohibitions would always supersede regulatory risk
allowances. Secondly, risk allowance trading would
be used to sharply reduce risks from existing levels,
protecting society against ills not yet addressed, and
at lower cost than fixed limits on risk. Thirdly, it
would solve the problem of exposure to more sensi-
tive subpopulations and the perversities of emissions
trading under hormesis, thereby protecting society
even better than emissions limits, taxes and trading
systems do. Fourthly, it would reinforce and improve
on the tort law system, which provides ex post
financial liability remedies for risk, by adding an ex
ante quantity limit on risk / a more protective and
credible regime, set at levels determined by compre-
hensive analysis of societal risks, without the high
transaction costs, variabilities and unpredictabilities
of litigation.
At the same time, risk bubbles and risk allowance
trading would have to satisfy important criteria. They
demand information about risk levels imposed by
different activities, and some means of making those
risks commensurable across different substances,
activities, populations and health endpoints. Stewart
notes: ‘Each such facility is given an individual risk
quota; a maximum level of risk that it may impose on
the environment as a result of the residuals that it
generates.Thefoundationof the ‘riskbubble’systemis
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a set of risk indices assigned to each residual and
measured in some common risk unit. A common risk
unit may, for example, be fixed as a level of the
environmental hazard created by a discharge of one
pound of a reference pollutant, the effects of which on
human health and the environment are well known.
Therelative risk measureofother regulated pollutants
aredeterminedandassignedinrelation to thebaseline
pollutant. An individual facility is free to select the
levels of specific residuals that it generates as long as
the aggregate risk imposed on human health and the
environment by all of the total discharge does not
exceed the facility’s maximum risk quota.’9
This will not be easy. The creation of ‘a comprehen-
sive system for indexing the relative environmental
risks of different residuals. . . presents a problem of
serious scientific difficulty.9 We would need better
information on emissions, associated exposures and
associated risks for a host of substances and activities,
including their synergistic or offsetting effects in
concert. Mechanisms, dose/response functions, ex-
posures and variability across populations would
need to be better understood and measured. Many
uncertainties in current science would need to be
ameliorated.Diverse risks would need tobe translated
into some version of commensurability / some set of
multiattribute risk metrics that can enable transparent
accounting and review. And improved monitoring,
perhaps by third parties as well as by government,
would be needed to ensure that firms’ risks are
accurately counted, reported and checked against
their allowances.
Yet these challenges are not unique to the risk
bubble/trading approach; they apply equally to the
current regime of fragmented command-and-control
and emission trading systems. Not indexing is tanta-
mount to indexing arbitrarily. ‘The relative stringency
of command requirements for control of different
residuals discharged into different media represents
a de facto index of relative risk and regulatory priority.
Thevirtueofariskbubbleapproach is that itmakes the
indexing issue explicit and focuses scientific research
andpolicyworkonimprovingsuchvaluesanddealing
explicitly and systematically with risk versus risk and
benefit versus benefit tradeoffs.9 Moreover, commen-
surabilityacrossrisksisanendogenousfunctionofour
investment in measuring and understanding, rather
than an inescapable extrinsic barrier.a The familiar
complaint that someone is inappropriately ‘compar-
ing apples and oranges’ actually disproves itself:
people regularly do compare apples and oranges
when choosing what to buy at the grocery store; the
statement that apples are different from oranges itself
constructs the comparison on which a choice could be
made (such as based on flavour, colour, nutrient
content, price and other attributes); and comparing
the difference between ‘apples and oranges’ to the
difference between the other two things that the
speaker is arguing cannot be compared (such as two
risks) is itselfacomparisonthatproves its feasibility.16
Indices of the relative impacts of different pollutants
can be constructed to enable transparent comparisons
across pollutants contributing to the same risk and,
potentially, different risks contributing to overall
harm.b
Likewise, inadequate monitoring impairs technol-
ogy-based and emissions-based regimes as well as
risk-based regimes. Who knows if the scrubber is
turned on, or operating effectively? Investments in
better monitoring are needed in all regulatory sys-
tems. The risk bubble/trading approach would direct
incentives toward (private sector) investment in
better monitoring of the activities and attributes
that actually contribute to harm. Dan Esty argues
that although risk bubbles ‘depend on a greater
degree of information than is generally currently
available. . . Today, however, with advanced pollu-
tion detection and tracking equipment, the technical
dimension of the risk bubble problem is becoming
increasingly tractable.’22 Likewise, Donald Elliott
and Gail Charnley stress the practicality of designing
effective risk bubbles and trading systems, if invest-
ments are made in the science of monitoring, mea-
surement and comparison.c Regulatory regimes can
be designed to reward industries’ investments in
a‘For risks that seem very ‘dissimilar’, risks cannot (yet) be
measured on a unidimensional scale, and the exercise of informed
value judgments becomes all the more central. . . . But it is chiefly
our lack of methods of comparison . . . that makes these risks seem
‘dissimilar’ or noncomparable, not an inherent incomm-
ensurability. As we improve methods of risk analysis, the idea
of calculating the ‘net risk’ of a risk portfolio, or the change in net
risk due to a risk tradeoff, may become more meaningful.’15
bIndices to compare multiple pollutants contributing to a single
risk have been successfully developed and used in the treaties
addressing CFCs (ozone depletion potential or ODP) and GHGs
(global warming potential or GWP). Indices to compare different
risks with each other can draw on willingness to pay/accept
approaches (using either revealed or stated preferences). Short of
full monetization, such indices can be constructed using
multiattribute decision theory, by combining different factors
into an index through additive weighting.17 21
c‘On the one hand, the more broadly the measures of equivalent
compliance are defined, the greater the opportunities for
flexibility, improved performance, and cost savings. Thus, a
comprehensive risk bubble that would permit one kind of
environmental risk to be traded off against another would
potentially provide the greatest benefit. On the other hand, the
difficulties of measuring ‘equivalency’ become greater the more
broadly the concept is defined. Thus, it is inherently easier to
equate one pound of sulphur dioxide released in one part of a
factory with an equivalent pound of the identical chemical
released somewhere else in the same facility. However, as
common metrics are developed for comparison purposes,
dissimilar environmental risks will be able to be traded off more
broadly against one another.’23,24
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improved monitoring. All of these challenges pose
the cost of new information against the value of new
information. If health and environmental risks are
important to our society, then investing in improved
methods of monitoring, measurement and compar-
ison can yield large net gains.
The legal regime for such a risk-based approach,
especially risk allowance trading across firms, has
yet to be designed. Project XL was unable to
stimulate widespread risk bubbling within firms
largely because of current legal requirements for
specific controls that such risk bubbles would have
had to overcome; even if EPA had agreed to waive
those requirements (in return for superior risk
reductions), citizens’ groups could sue to enforce
them. Thus firms were hesitant to agree to risk
reductions in some areas when EPA could not
promise relief from other rules that did little to
reduce risk. New legislation would be needed to
authorize full risk bubbles with intrafirm flexibility.
And risk allowance trading across firms would
require major new legislation, likely with special
attention to whether risk allowance trading would
prevent or exacerbate hotspots. A potentially greater
obstacle is the motivation of interest groups and
members of Congress to maintain bureaucratic con-
trol and claim credit for separate initiatives by
keeping the environmental regulatory system frag-
mented into different laws and committees; integra-
tion may make social sense but not political sense.
Gradual experience with risk bubbling could be
gained through initiatives like Project XL, through
practice under Clean Air sections 112(g) and 612
noted above, and through multimedia permitting.
The EPA could begin developing the transparent
indices and monitoring systems. Industry could be
encouraged to finance this work by offering en-
hanced abatement credit in return for better mon-
itoring of emissions, exposure and risk.25 In
addition, there is a move afoot in the current
Congress to pass new ‘three pollutant’ air quality
legislation, covering SOx , NOx and mercury, with a
possibility of adding CO2 as well. This legislation
would authorize some interpollutant trading (e.g.,
SOx /NOx ), which would build experience with the
monitoring, risk assessment and commensurability
needed for risk allowance trading.
Conclusion
Hammitt is right to raise the possible problems
posed for emissions trading or taxes by hormesis,
but as this comment has illustrated, the problem is
not as serious as might be thought. For emissions
trading or taxes to be undermined by hormesis, the
necessary conditions involve not just hormesis but
also local emissions effects, a level of protection set
at or near the hormetic minimum-effects level, and a
pattern of selling and buying by sources along the
dose/response curve in a direction that poses a net
increase in harm. Fairness concerns about hotspots
are distinct from hormetic effects. And to the extent
that hormesis does pose problems for emissions
trading and taxes, an eventual shift toward risk
trading and taxes is the superior route.
At the same time, several issues of interest remain
unaddressed. One question is how a hormetic dose/
response function and a more complex emissions/
exposure function would interact. Another is what
an empirical review of the actual performance of
fixed emissions limits and tradable emissions al-
lowances in the past, illuminated by evidence about
the dose/response function, would reveal about
whether hormesis and emissions trading have con-
flicted in practice. A third is whether hormesis
would have implications for the choice between tax-
es (prices) versus allowance trading (quantities) /
which it might, given the importance of differently
sloped marginal benefit functions for this choice.26
A fourth is whether these issues bear on different
methods of allocating allowances to sources. Further
analysis and empirical study of dose/response
functions and policy instruments could help im-
prove the selection of instruments to match the
complexities of real environmental problems.
Acknowledgement
I thank James Hammitt for helpful comments on an
earlier draft.
References
1 Hammitt JK. Economic implications of hormesis. Hu-
man Exp Toxicol 2004; 23: 267/78.
2 Calabrese EJ, Baldwin L. U-shaped dose-responses in
biology, toxicology, and public health. Annu Rev
Public Health 2001; 22: 15/33.
3 Cross FB. Legal implications of hormesis. Human Exp
Toxicol 2001; 20: 122/28 (and related comments in
this symposium issue).
4 Wiener JB. Global environmental regulation: instrument
choice in legal context. Yale Law J 1999; 108: 677/800.
Hormesis, hotspots and emissions trading
JB Wiener
300
5 Johnson SM. Economics v. equity: do market-based
environmental reforms exacerbate environmental in-
justice? Wash Lee L Rev 1999; 56: 111, 125/26.
6 Stewart RB, Wiener JB. Reconstructing climate policy.
Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2003.
7 Roberts MJ, Spence M. Effluent charges and licenses
under uncertainty. J Public Econ 1976; 5: 193/208.
8 Portney PR. Reforming environmental regulation: three
modest proposals. Iss Sci Technol 1988; Winter: 74/
81, and Reforming environmental regulation: three
modest proposals. Columbia J Environ Law 1988; 13:
201, 207/209.
9 Stewart RB. A new generation of environmental
regulation? Capital Univ Law Rev 2001; 29: 21, 64/
66, 96 (See also id. at 116/122 (analysing risk bubbles
in detail)).
10 Pedersen WF. Contracting with the regulated for better
regulations. Admin Law Rev 2001; 53: 1067 (advocat-
ing government-industry contracts that apply risk
bubbles to improve risk protection while lowering
costs).
11 Farber DA. Rethinking regulatory reform after Amer-
ican Trucking . Pace Law Rev 2002; 23: 43, 70.
12 Harvard Group on Risk Management Reform. Reform-
ing risk regulation: achieving more protection at less
cost. Hum Ecol Risk Assessment 1995; 1: 183/206.
13 Cross FB. Incorporating hormesis in risk regulation.
Environ Law Rep 2000; 30: 10778.
14 Guruswamy L. Integrated pollution control: the ex-
panding matrix. Environ Law 1992; 22: 77/90.
15 Graham JD, Wiener JB. Risk vs. risk: tradeoffs in
protecting health and the environment . Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.
16 Chodosh HE. Comparing comparisons: in search of
methodology. Iowa Law Rev 1999; 84: 1025, 1061/63.
17 Viscusi WK, Magat W, Huber J. Pricing environmental
health risks: survey assessments of risk/risk and risk/
dollar tradeoffs for chronic bronchitis. J Environ Econ
Manag 1991; 21: 32/51.
18 Baron J. Thinking and deciding , 3rd edition. Cam-
bridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press,
2000.
19 Keeney RL, Raiffa H. Decisions with multiple objec-
tives: preferences and value tradeoffs . New York:
Wiley, 1976: 84.
20 Payne JW. Bettman JR, Johnson EJ. The adaptive
decision maker. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1993.
21 von Winterfeldt D, Edwards W. Decision analysis and
behavioral research . New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1986; 259/77.
22 Esty DC. Next generation environmental law: a re-
sponse to Richard Stewart. Capital Univ Law Rev 2001;
29: 183, 196 (citations omitted).
23 Elliott ED, Charnley G. Toward bigger bubbles: why
interpollutant and interrisk trading are good ideas and
how we get there from here. Forum Appl Res Public
Policy 1998; Winter: 48.
24 Elliott ED. Toward ecological law and policy. In
Chertow MR, Esty DC eds. Thinking ecologically: the
next generation of environmental policy. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1997: 184.
25 Wiener JB. Solving the precautionary paradox: policy
approaches to improve measurement of greenhouse gas
sources and sinks. In van Ham J, Janssen LHJM, Swart
RJ eds. Non-CO2 greenhouse gases . Dordrecht, Nether-
lands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994: 527/31.
26 Weitzman M. Prices versus quantities. Rev Econ Stud
1974; 41: 477.
27 Nash JR, Revesz RL. Markets and geography: designing
marketable permit schemes to control local and
regional pollutants. Ecology Law Quarterly 2001; 28:
569.
Hormesis, hotspots and emissions trading
JB Wiener
301
